Has Washington’s Middle East Policy Failed?

Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt, what a year this has been. Or what a decade, really. It reminds me of that old curse: “May you live in interesting times.” We certainly are living in interesting times.

Matt Kroenig: Yes. Interesting and terribly tragic. Of course, we are talking about the Hamas attack in southern Israel last week and the Israeli response. More than 1,200 Israelis—most of them civilians—have been killed, many in gruesome ways; approximately 100-150 Israelis have been taken hostage by Hamas. Foreign nationals have also been caught in the violence, with at least 25 Americans among the dead.

Israel has responded. The Israelis killed the remaining Hamas fighters inside Israel, conducted massive airstrikes against Gaza that have killed 1,400 people, and have called up 360,000 reservists for what looks to be an impending ground invasion.

This tragedy has rightly been described as Israel’s 9/11.

What are your thoughts?

EA: It’s horrifying. There’s not much else to say there. The gruesome violence, the unexpected nature of the attack—it’s absolutely awful. And there’s no doubt there will be further violence; Israel is likely to launch a ground assault on Gaza, with devastating humanitarian costs for Palestinian civilians.

At the same time, there are significant geopolitical implications. This attack didn’t come from nowhere; the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Arab governments, and even the United States—they all had bet that if they ignored the Palestinian question and simply focused on broader geopolitical questions, that it would just go away. This attack has proved that to be fundamentally a false assumption.

Let’s start with the immediate questions, though. Is there anything the U.S. government can do to stop this from exploding further? It seems as if the minimal steps Washington has taken—urging at least some restraint on the part of Israel and stationing an aircraft carrier in the region as a deterrent to Iran—are about all that can be done at the moment.

MK: Well, my first immediate takeaway is the astounding failure of intelligence and warning. Israel’s intelligence services are considered among the best in the world. The United States also has impressive intelligence capabilities. How did they both miss this?

EA: The intelligence failure is staggering, but it’s too early to know the cause. Perhaps it was the turmoil of recent Israeli domestic politics—Foreign Policy has a good piece by Elena Grossfeld on this angle and the comparison to the 1973 intelligence failure. Or perhaps it was a 9/11-style case of an intelligence agency seeing the pieces but not connecting the dots. It seems that U.S. intelligence agencies missed this, too, which is something that Congress may wish to explore in coming months. What else?

MK: On the U.S. side, I do wonder if the intelligence failure is at least partially the result of the strategic pivot from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific. There are only so many intelligence assets, and not everything can be a collection priority.

Next, I am struck by the reality that Israel has no good options. This will not be business as usual. The typical response would be for Israel to have some kind of limited military reprisal against Hamas, Washington to call for restraint, things to cool down for a while, and the cycle to repeat.

But this time is different. A limited response will not be sufficient. Israeli officials have talked about how they will eliminate Hamas. And if U.S. officials have called for restraint this time, I missed it. In President Joe Biden’s big speech on Tuesday, he said he expected Israel’s response to be “swift, decisive, and overwhelming.” There was no mention of the “R” word.

I think we can expect a bigger military conflict.

EA: The White House has been more cautious in the last day or two; administration officials are not calling for restraint, but I do think there’s some wariness about how bad this could get. They’ve called for a “proportionate” Israel response. Further conflict here is inevitable. But what Biden might be able to avoid is both mass humanitarian casualties inside Gaza, and hopefully, any spiral into a broader regional war.

MK: A big challenge is that Israel does not have any good military options. The most likely path will be to conduct a large-scale invasion, capture and kill everyone associated with Hamas, destroy Hamas’s military capability, and then pull out. But that doesn’t solve the problem. The underlying sources of instability—such as the radical ideology and the lack of effective economic and political institutions in Gaza—are still there, and a new generation of Hamas leaders will almost certainly rise up and fill the vacuum.

A second option would be to remain and occupy Gaza. But that is also not a good option. Israel decided that the continual occupation of Gaza was too difficult and costly and pulled out for good reason in 2005.

A third option, in theory, would essentially be ethnic cleansing: the shocking proposition of seeking the large-scale and permanent displacement of Palestinians in Gaza. There is at least one member of the Israeli parliament calling for a “second Nakba” (invoking an Arabic word for “catastrophe” that refers to the forced displacement of Palestinians after the creation of present-day Israel in 1948). Fortunately, the new Israeli unity government will almost certainly consider that option beyond the pale.

So, I suspect we will see something like the first option (and to answer your above question, I think Israel will receive at least tacit U.S. support), but it will be bloody for both sides and will not permanently solve the underlying problem.

I wonder if there is some room for the shock of this attack to prompt a renewed attempt to find a solution. It’s not impossible for seemingly intractable conflicts to find solutions; consider Northern Ireland.

EA: There is no military solution to this problem. What you describe as Option 1 has basically been Israeli policy for years now; bottle the Palestinians up inside Gaza and the West Bank, ignore them, and “mow the lawn” every so often to remove obvious terrorist threats. That’s only going to breed resentment and more violence, particularly when it’s coupled with a relatively far-right Israeli government that has been openly supportive of settlement building in the West Bank and other steps that undermine any future peace process.

The contours of the Israel-Palestine problem haven’t changed: a two-state solution is perceived as politically risky by many Israeli leaders. It’s much easier, after all, to grab small chunks of land, improve ties with the Arab states, and just ignore the problem. A one-state solution, meanwhile, risks making Jews a minority in their own country.

But I do wonder if there is some room for the shock of this attack to prompt a renewed attempt to find a solution. It’s not impossible for seemingly intractable conflicts to find solutions; consider the example of Northern Ireland. When I was a kid, there were bombs going off regularly. But the peace process of the late 1990s, and the devolution and power-sharing agreements it produced, have created a largely peaceful situation today—even if the region’s government is dysfunctional and there are occasional flare-ups.

Or consider the example of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which started with a surprise attack on Israel almost 50 years to the day before Saturday’s massacre but eventually helped create the circumstances that produced peace between Israel and Egypt. Perhaps this is the time for the United States to lead diplomatically? Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy was a vital part of ending that war and setting the stage, several years later, for the Camp David Accords.

Biden could do something similar: perhaps working with Arab governments to find an alternative to Hamas in Gaza, or even just a better seat at the table for the Palestinians. The surge in U.S. support to Israel now gives Washington leverage that it hasn’t had in a long time, and the Arab states would be thrilled to find a way out of this mess.

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MK: At some point, that might be worth a try, but it is premature. After this horrific attack, Washington will give Israel the time and space to degrade the Hamas threat. Even if Biden knows this is not a permanent solution, there is little political or diplomatic advantage to holding Israel back after what it just suffered.

I am also skeptical, however, that U.S. leadership alone will solve this problem. The United States led the Middle East peace process for years, and the biggest obstacle to the two-state solution was not that it was “too risky for Israel,” but that it was too risky for Palestinian leaders. Former Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat basically said that he was afraid of the extremists on his side and did not want his legacy to be defined as a traitor to the Palestinian cause by making peace with Israel. Given this past record of diplomatic failure, low prospects for future success, and Washington’s other priorities—such as the Indo-Pacific—I just don’t see the Biden administration making this a front-burner issue.

Perhaps this crisis will bring a new generation of more courageous leaders willing to take risks for peace, but I am doubtful.

Given this past record of diplomatic failure, low prospects for future success, and Washington’s other priorities—such as the Indo-Pacific—I just don’t see the Biden administration making this a front-burner issue. 

EA: There’s fault on both sides for previous failures to find a solution. But the status quo is simply unworkable. And in recent years, I really think that the U.S. approach has been extremely counterproductive. The Trump administration, in particular, took steps to marginalize the peace process and Palestinians more generally. And the United States has come to be perceived as backing the relatively extreme Israeli government under Netanyahu—even as many Israeli citizens have been out in the streets protesting his policies.

I’d go as far as to argue that these attacks call into question the entire U.S. approach to the region. Ignoring the Palestinian issue while trying to forge a U.S.-backed security bloc with normalized relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia sounded good on paper. But in practice, it has pushed regional militant groups closer to Iran and hardened existing lines of conflict. It is wildly unpopular with the populations of the Gulf states, many of whom are deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. It’s honestly hard to see how U.S. policymakers thought this could be a viable approach to the region as a whole.

What do you think? Can U.S. Middle East policy be saved?

MK: Well, I think you may be giving the United States too much credit. Is there a Biden administration policy for the Middle East? If so, I do not know what it is. Brett McGurk, Biden’s senior director for Middle East policy, gave a speech on the Biden Middle East doctrine at the Atlantic Council earlier this year, but it was a list of principles, such as “partnerships” and “integration,” not a real strategy.

I think the overriding hope was that reentering the Iran nuclear deal would be the centerpiece of the regional approach. That did not pan out, so the Biden administration continued to attempt to engage Iran in what has basically become an appeasement strategy.

Biden also came in wanting to distance the United States from long-standing partners, vowing to turn Saudi Arabia into a “pariah” state, and publicly criticizing Israel for its planned judicial reforms. Then the administration realized that was a bad idea and pivoted to negotiating a Israel-Saudi rapprochement, but the terms were lopsided; the United States would have had to give up too much for too little.

You can criticize the Trump administration’s strategy, but at least there was a coherent and consistent overall approach—to work with Washington’s traditional partners, including Israel and the Gulf states, to impose “maximum pressure” on Iran.

This leads to another challenge. In other major regions, such as Europe and Asia, there is bipartisan consensus and rough continuity in U.S. policy. Since the Iran nuclear deal—or maybe since the 2003 Iraq War—Washington’s policy in the region does a 180-degree turn with each change in administration.

EA: Yes, the partisan polarization of U.S. foreign policy on Iran has been a significant problem. Ukraine policy is starting to follow the same path. And while bipartisan foreign policy isn’t always a good thing—it did give us the Iraq War!—it is usually better than the whiplash-inducing approach we’ve taken to Iran.

You’re right that Biden hasn’t been consistent on the Middle East. He started out criticizing both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Netanyahu, before embracing them and offering significant concessions over the last year. Middle East policy under Biden has been an atrocious, muddled mess.

So, this is the administration’s opportunity to fix it. It’s time for bold action, and I don’t just mean the administration’s almost pathetically sneaky attempt to smuggle Ukraine aid into a congressional bill supporting Israel.

Here are my suggestions: First, the administration should work with Egypt to provide the support for safe passage for civilians fleeing Gaza. Egypt doesn’t have the capacity to take that many refugees at once; the United States can help with funding, aid, and infrastructure assistance that would make it possible for these civilians to cross into Egypt. If that doesn’t work, Washington should help to orchestrate evacuations by sea. Americans should also help with the evacuation of U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals from Gaza, and also from Israel proper if it turns out to be needed.

Second, Biden should pivot his push for Saudi-Israeli normalization into a push to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There’s now a national unity government in Israel, which potentially removes one of the political obstacles to giving some concessions. What if an Israeli assault on Gaza were to remove Hamas, but open the door to some Israeli concessions to the rest of the population, such as ending the blockade? A genuine deal that addresses concerns about the future of the Palestinians would undermine Iran’s influence on Palestinian militant groups and allow for more broad-based Arab support for normalization with Israel.

It might be a pipe dream. But if there’s one thing the tragedies of the last week make clear, it’s that something needs to change.

The United States should demand that Qatar extradite to the United States for trial the Hamas leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, whom it shelters in Doha.

MK: I like the search for practical options. Let me offer two of my own: At least 25 Americans have been killed in this heinous attack. Since 9/11, U.S. policy has been to hold accountable state sponsors of terrorism. The United States should demand that Qatar extradite to the United States for trial the Hamas leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, whom it shelters in Doha.

EA: Sure. This is an ideal situation to use targeted sanctions against anyone in Qatar or other Middle Eastern states who is directly linked to these attacks and the atrocities involved. But while I’m no international lawyer, I’m pretty sure you would need to do extraditions or prosecutions through something like the International Criminal Court. I don’t think you can just try foreign nationals in U.S. courts for crimes overseas.

What else?

MK: Second, Biden should order a raid by special operations forces to free American hostages in Gaza.

Third, there are many reasons to believe that Iran was behind this attack. We know Iran has funded Hamas for many years. Hamas’s leaders themselves claim that Iran helped orchestrate the attack, and the scale and sophistication of the operation suggests that Hamas received outside help. The United States should hold Tehran accountable, including with possible military reprisals. Washington has been too soft on the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, and the results speak for themselves. It is time for a tougher approach.

EA: OK, that’s where you lose me. Has Iran been funding and arming Hamas and Hezbollah for years? Yes. Was Iran directly involved in planning these specific attacks? Thus far, the evidence points to no. Or at least, U.S. intelligence and the Israeli Defense Forces both say there’s no evidence.

And military reprisals against Iran would be the thing most likely to turn this into a regional conflagration. If you want to undermine Iranian influence, then we need to find a better solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not add more fuel to the fire.

MK: We agree that Iran funds and arms a terrorist group that just killed 25 Americans. That is sufficient evidence to warrant a strong U.S. response, in my view.

I think we are at the end of the column, and as hard as this may be to believe, I don’t think we were able to solve the Middle East peace problem in 2,000 words or less.

[Ed: Ahem. You got 2,800 words, and you still couldn’t do it.]

EA: That’s the least surprising thing this week, certainly. Well, we’ll just have to hope that the violence in the Middle East doesn’t escalate too much, and that policymakers are wise enough to try to find a way out of this mess—whether or not they listen to our advice.